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CAN HOMOSEXUAL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
WITHSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF BOWERS V.
HARDWICK?
John P. Safranek, M.D.'
Stephen J. Safranel'
One constitutional triumph does not make a right to equality.
Like other recent homosexual' legal victories, the recent Baker v.
Vermone decision failed to guarantee the full measure of equality
that homosexuals seek. Instead of granting the same-sex
plaintiffs in Baker the legal right to marry, the Vermont Supreme
Court merely required the state legislature to extend benefits to
homosexuals similar to those enjoyed by married heterosexuals.3
Thus, nearly fifteen years after Bowers v. Hardwick,4 homosexuals
still possess neither a right to marry nor a federal right to sodomy.
In light of Baker's limited achievement, as well as the dim
prospects for other progressive legal advances at the state level,
+ B.A., University of San Francisco; M.D., University of Nebraska; Ph.D., Catholic University of
America.
" Professor of Law, Ave Mafia School of Law; B.A., University of San Francisco; M.A.,
University of Dallas; J.D., University of Notre Dame. The authors would like to thank Creighton
University School of Law for the use of its library. They would also like to thank Louis L.
Safranek for his editorial input.
1. We ascribe the term "homosexual" to both male and female individuals
who retain erotic desires for persons of the same sex. JUDD MARMOR, Overview:
The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN
REAPPRAISAL 5 (Judd Marmor ed. 1980) (describing a homosexual or gay person as
one "who is motivated in adult life by a definite preferential erotic attraction to
members of the same sex and who usually (but not necessarily) engages in overt
sexual relations with them") (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). Our society is
sensitive to the permutations in nominal classifications of individuals attracted to
persons of their own gender. See MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY AND LESBIAN
LIBERATION MOVEMENT 3 (1992) (distinguishing the term gay from homosexual as a
political term associated with the gay movement). The term homosexual is
preferred because it is the most gender-neutral ascription of the sexual character
of both females and males with this erotic inclination.
2. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
3. Id. at 886 ("While some future case may attempt to establish that... the
denial of a marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionally-protected
rights, that is not the claim we address today.").
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a due process right to homosexual sodomy).
703
Catholic University Law Review
homosexual rights proponents may be tempted to forego state
challenges in favor of federal litigation. This Article examines the
prospects for a substantive federal homosexual right to sodomy
and to marriage. 5 This Article also considers only equal protection
claims because the United States Supreme Court is unlikely to
expand due process rights given the stare decisis deference that it
would accord Hardwick.6 Moreover, homosexual rights advocates
almost universally predicate substantive homosexual rights claims
on the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process
Clause.7
In this Article, we argue that federal homosexual equal
protection rights cannot be sustained until the United States
Supreme Court rejects Bowers v. Hardwick root and branch.8 We
contend that many scholars sympathetic to homosexual rights
have overlooked Hardwick's considerable precedential impact on
equal protection claims.9  Further, those who have probed
Hardwick's impact have failed to uncouple its holding from
homosexual equal protection claims. Although we discuss
primarily a federal constitutional right, our discussion illuminates
some of the salient claims offered by Vermont jurists in the Baker
decision, and, therefore, where appropriate, we apply our analysis
to this decision.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I examines
Hardwicks impact on three distinct equal protection claims that
are grounded on rational review, strict scrutiny, and the right to
5. In this Article, Homosexual rights encompass only marriage and sodomy,
unless otherwise specified.
6. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (defending
the principle of stare decisis).
7. See Cathy Harris, Outing Privacy Litigation: Toward a Contextual Strategy
for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 248, 261-64 (1997)
(summarizing relevant literature). There are reasons for appealing to equal
protection rather than due process. One chief reason among them is the
impoverished private/public dichotomy. Id. at 255-58.
8. Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in
Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 958 (1998) ("[Glay rights
litigators must set their sights on the ultimate reversal of Bowers. As long as
Bowers remains good law it will be a pernicious force working to defeat gay rights
efforts at every turn.").
9. See id. for exceptions to the monolithic underestimation of Hardwick. See
also Nan D. Hunter, Life Aflter Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 531-32
(1992) ("Since Hardwick was decided, the threshold question in the litigation of
lesbian and gay rights cases has become whether Hardwick only extinguishes the
claim to a substantive due process privacy right, or whether it also predetermines
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.").
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marry. Part II critiques two alternative equal protection theories in
light of the shortcomings of the equal protection claims discussed
in Part I. First, we explore Cass Sunstein's attempt to isolate due
process precedents from the realm of equal protection. If
successful, such an attempt would safeguard homosexual equal
protection claims from Hardwick. Second, we explore Ronald
Dworkin's theory that equal protection requires equal respect of all
interests, including homosexuals. Finally, Part III exposes the
inherent due process character of homosexual equal protection
claims by analyzing the fundamental character of homosexual
relationships. In conclusion, we find no federal constitutional
support for a homosexual right to sodomy or marriage.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS
In this section, we highlight the challenge that Hardwick poses
for federal homosexual equal protection claims. Parts A and B
analyze conventional homosexual equal protection strategies
that pertain to rational review and strict scrutiny. Part C
critiques a federal right to homosexual marriage.
A. Rational Review of Homosexual Rights
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans'o inspired many homosexual rights advocates. However,
although the United States Supreme Court condemned the
"animus" that motivated Colorado voters to exclude
homosexuals as a class," the Justices failed to offer a rationale
that either establishes a beach-head for future litigation or
challenges the holding of Hardwick. This section exposes the
vulnerability of homosexual rights to state interests under the
more relaxed standard of rational review applied by the Supreme
Court in Romer.
The Supreme Court protected homosexual rights in Romer by
applying rational review1 2 to Colorado's Amendment Two, 13 which
10. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
11. Id. at 633-35 "The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the
right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our
jurisprudence.").
12. See id. at 631-36. Rational review was first described in Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1979). In Vance, the Court explained that courts 'Vill not
overturn... a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons
is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that
[a court] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Id. at 97.
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denied protection to homosexuals because of their sexual
preference. The Court did not apply strict 14 or intermediate
scrutiny,'5 either by establishing the fundamental character of
the right to homosexual conduct' 6 or affirming the politically
exclusionary character of Amendment Two.' 7 Instead, the Court
chose to apply the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny,
rational review,' 8 which merely requires a state to relate its
classification of citizens to a legitimate state interest.' 9
The Court's choice of rational review, rather than a stricter
standard, threatens homosexual interests. First, this standard
of review allows critics to castigate the Justices for invalidating a
statute reasonably related to legitimate state interests that the
Court did not directly dispute. Second, although the Court's
13. The statewide referendum known as "Amendment Two" added section 30b
to Article II of the Colorado State Constitution. It provided, in part, that:
[nleither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies.., shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status ....
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
14. The concept of strict scrutiny was born in United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone's renowned footnote stated
that "legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny." Id.
15. This classification is even more opaque than other aspects of equal
protection jurisprudence. The Court has applied intermediate level scrutiny to
"quasi-suspect" classifications in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982) (involving gender); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)
(involving illegitimacy); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 (1982) (involving
alienage in certain circumstances); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982)
(involving illegal alien status of minors).
16. See infra Part II.A (discussing Cass Sunstein's influential argument for
homosexual rights).
17. But see Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993) (Amendment
Two "fenced] out... [a] class of persons from seeking governmental action
favorable to it and thus, from participating equally in the political process."). The
Colorado Supreme Court used the politically exclusionary nature of the
amendment to justify the application of strict scrutiny. Id.
18. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
19. Rational review, the weakest standard of equal protection scrutiny, is the
standard the Court usually employs when adjudicating issues of social welfare and
economics. See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986) (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)).
20. See Timothy M. Tynkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and
Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 287, 288 (1997)
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rationale-that Amendment Two was both "too narrow and too
broad"2 _- sufficiently protected some homosexual rights in
Romer, it actually invites more carefully crafted anti-homosexual
statutes, such as proscriptions against marriage, that do not
deny homosexuals "protection across the board."2 2  Third,
because the Court was unwilling either to articulate a cogent
argument for homosexual rights23 or to reevaluate Hardwick, the
Romer majority rejected Amendment Two under rational review
24by imputing "animus" as the motivation for the measure.
Thus, the majority offered only the thinnest of jurisprudential
reeds in its timid retreat into its tenuous justification.
Moreover, the Court further vitiated its languid justification of
Romer by failing even to mention Hardwick. Instead of
reconciling the two cases by perhaps casting some dubiety on
the latter, the majority fell silent, as if the two decisions could
logically co-exist.2 5  Jurists, ill-disposed to homosexual rights,
have noted that if Hardwick allows states to criminalize an act
(arguing that the judiciary rejected conventional applications of rational review);
see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
opinion as "an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will").
21. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
22. Id.
23. The Court could have attempted to protect homosexual interests by
acknowledging that statutes such as Amendment Two subvert homosexuals'
ability to participate in the political process, a rationale the Colorado Supreme
Court used in employing strict scrutiny. Cf Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285
(Colo. 1993) (finding that the amendment bars an adequate voice in government).
24. Earlier Supreme Court decisions have noted the shortcoming of this
rationale. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 647-49 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
But no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted
for it. . . . That opinion [,United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968),] explained well the hazards of declaring a law unconstitutional
because of the motivations of its sponsors. First, it is extremely
difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different
motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment .... [11f the law is
struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or
effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or
relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.
Id (citation omitted); cf. Equality Foun. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 293 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Indeed, a reviewing court in
this circuit may not even inquire into the electorate's possible actual motivations
for adopting a measure via initiative or referendum, instead, the court must
consider all hypothetical justifications which potentially support the enactment.")
(citation omitted).
25. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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so crucial to this class of citizens, then other less egregious anti-
homosexual statutes can hardly be proscribed.26
Notwithstanding Romer, homosexuals can hardly hope to
obtain federal constitutional rights to apply to acts such as
sodomy under rational review. In his dissent, Justice Scalia
attempted to preclude a higher level of review for homosexual
claims by emphasizing that the Romer majority employed
27rational review. Scalia realizes the untenability of vindicating
substantial homosexual rights through rational review, and the
majority's application of this standard in Romer, confirmed the
minimal burden that states must overcome to justify anti-
homosexual statutes. Thus, neither Romer nor its standard of
rational review is sufficiently potent to justify meaningful future
homosexual rights. The prospect for using the more rigorous
standard of strict scrutiny is the subject of the next section.
B. Strict Scrutiny of Homosexual Rights
This section considers the justification for strictly scrutinizing
anti-homosexual statutes. 8 This standard of review, which
requires the state to show that its statute is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest,30 would almost certainly vindicate
26. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
If the Court [in Hardwick] was unwilling to object to state laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open.., to
conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is
invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.
Id.; see also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
571 (9th Cir. 1990).
27. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 n. 1 (Scalla, J., dissenting) ('The Court evidently
agrees that 'rational basis'-the normal test for compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause-is the governing standard.").
28. The judiciary has not achieved a consensus regarding the level of review to
apply to the homosexual right to marry. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307, 331 (D.C. 1995) (finding no fundamental right to enter into gay
marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (stating
that marriage statutes do not classify on the basis of sex). But see Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44, 63-64 (Haw. 1993) (requiring strict scrutiny under the Hawaiian
Constitution); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL
88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998) (requiring strict scrutiny under the
Alaska Constitution).
29. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
30. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (asserting that
racial classifications are "suspect" and demanding "rigid scrutiny" of their
justifications): see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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homosexual rights claims.3 1  However, homosexuals' social
achievements have imperiled this strategy.
The Court's strict scrutiny doctrine, which has been marked
by discrepant delineation rather than organic evolution,32
implicates several criteria that homosexual rights proponents
would find difficult to fulfill. The Court formulated its first set of
criteria in United States v. Carolene Products Co.33 by proscribing
governmental action that is influenced by prejudice against
"discrete and insular minorities" and prejudice that limits the
operation of "political processes" which normally protect them.34
However, homosexuals are not "discrete" in the readily
identifiable sense that the Court ascribed to racial minorities in
Carolene Products, and only an individual blinded by sexual
stereotypes would think otherwise. 35  Nor are homosexuals
insular. Unlike African-Americans in the first-half of the 20th
Century, homosexuals occupy a wide range of social, economic,
and professional positions. Moreover, they continue to wield
increasing influence in "political processes." Although
homosexuals constitute only four percent of Colorado's
electorate, they garnered the support of forty-six percent of the
voting electorate against Amendment Two.36  Such success
would have been improbable only two decades ago.3 7
Proponents of homosexual rights also seek to trigger strict
scrutiny by invoking the other criteria of suspectness. 38 The two
31. For example, Professor Gerald Gunther's well-known formulation indicates
that although this level of review is "strict" in theory, it is usually "fatal" in fact.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972).
32. Both liberal and conservative jurists have acknowledged the shortcomings
of equal protection jurisprudence. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
34. Id at 152-53 n.4
35. Homosexuals are not physically identifiable like other suspect classes. Cf.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (describing aliens as "an
identifiable class of persons").
36. See Tymkovich et al., supra note 20, at 294.
37. See Petitioner's Brief at 42 n.29, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.
94-1039) The State of Colorado noted that homosexuals succeeded in repealing
sodomy statutes in twenty-seven states and included sexual orientation in the
federal hatecrimes statute. Id.
38. The Court first employed the term "suspect" in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The criteria of Carolene Products have been subsumed
20011 709
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characteristics of suspectness that homosexual equal protection
proponents39 invoke are "immutability''40  and a history of
prejudice.41 Neither of these arguments is probative.42 When the
Court specified immutability as characteristic of suspect classes,
it spoke of "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth."4 3 Unlike race, which is immutably determined
by ancestry, the precise etiology of homosexuality eludes
science. 4  Hence, the failure of science to demonstrate the
immutability of homosexuality imperils the argument for
homosexual "suspectness."
45
under the category of "suspectness" even though the Court adjudicated this case
six years before the Court used this term. See generally Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938).
39. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign Fund et al. at
1, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039); see also Note, The
Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification. 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1300 (1985); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An
Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 812-15 (1984).
40. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (denying "suspect" status to illegal
aliens on the ground that undocumented status is not an immutable
characteristic).
41. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting
that among traditional indicia of suspectness includes being "subjected to... a
history of purposeful unequal treatment").
42. See Pickhardt, supra note 8, at 948-51 (arguing cogently that many gay
rights arguments threaten to undermine the broader gay rights movement).
43. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
44. Scientific studies have drawn ambiguous conclusions, at best, regarding
the causes of homosexuality. For arguments hinting at a biological connection to
homosexuality, see generally Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure
Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991) and
Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, Are Some People Born Gay?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1991, at A21. But see IMOTHY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE: THE ETHICS OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION RESEARCH 47 (Lillian Faderman & Larry Gross eds., 1997) (stating
that the initial excitement over these discoveries has been tempered by subsequent
scrutiny).
45. The Court's circumscription of suspectness in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985), by mitigating the importance of
immutability, further undermines this homosexual endeavor.
[11f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect ... it would be difficult to find a principled way
to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable
disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need
mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we
decline to do so.
710
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Even conceding that homosexuals have suffered a history of• 4 6
prejudice, this criteria of "suspectness" is insufficient by itself
to trigger strict scrutiny. Given the inability of homosexuals to
fulfill most of the criteria for "suspectness," the chances for
attaining any degree of heightened scrutiny are remote. 8
The greater challenge in obtaining the suspect or semi-suspect
classification for homosexuals is Hardwick. Hardwick seems to
preclude heightened scrutiny by permitting states to criminalize
the act that is integral to the very essence of their classification
as homosexuals.4 9 Therefore, even if homosexuals were able to
fulfill some of the criteria of a semi-suspect class, they must first
reconcile equal protection and the holding in Hardwick, which
federal jurists have used to deny homosexuals heightened
scrutiny.50 Thus, homosexual rights proponents must uncouple
equal protection claims for suspectness or semi-suspectness
from the due process jurisprudence of Hardwick.51
Id. at 445-46.
46. See Miller, supra note 39, at 799-800; see also Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 737 (1985) (stating a potential,
albeit unintended, criticism of this view that "olne person's 'prejudice' is,
notoriously, another's 'principle'); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063, 1073 (1980) (discussing
the difficulty in distinguishing principled disapproval from prejudice).
47. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 154 (1980) (stating that the law has historically and appropriately
disadvantaged criminals). Thus, these authors posit that homosexual proponents
cannot assert that homosexual criminal sanctions constitute prejudice without
begging the question. They must first undermine the arguments against
homosexuality before invoking this criterion.
48. The Court has not applied heightened scrutiny to the elderly who do
fulfill most of the criteria. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312-14 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting strict scrutiny as the proper test in
upholding, on traditional rational basis grounds, a Massachusetts statute
requiring retirement at age fifty for state uniformed police); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 108-09 (1979) (finding the Foreign Service's mandatory retirement age of
sixty is rationally related to the legislative objective). The Court also has not given
heightened scrutiny to the mentally handicapped who also fulfill most of the
criteria. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985)
(holding mental redtardation is not a quasi-suspect classification)
49. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-122 (Michie 2001); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2000).
50. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Officer, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir.
1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
51. See Pickhardt, supra note 8, at 956-60.
20011
Catholic University Law Review
C. The Homosexual Right to Marry
The precedential influence of Hardwick has spurred scholars
to develop alternative equal protection theories that circumvent
anti-homosexual constitutional law. The right to homosexual
marriage is among the most promising equal protection
alternatives.52  Part C explores various forms of this equal
protection claim, but focuses only on a federal right to marry.5 3
Homosexual rights proponents analogize the constitutional
claim of homosexuals seeking to wed with that of the interracial
couple in Loving v. Virginia.54 Proponents' arguments assume
one of two forms. The first form claims that the Supreme Court
recognized the fundamental right to marry in several due
5process cases and that homosexuals retain the same
fundamental right to marry as all other citizens. This equal
protection claim putatively triggers strict scrutiny because it
pertains to a fundamental right.56 The second form asserts that
homosexual marriage does not differ from heterosexual or
interracial marriages, and ceteris paribus, homosexuals retain
the same right as these heterosexual or interracial couples.
5 7
The obvious strength of both claims is their circumvention of
Hardwick's tolerance of anti-homosexual sodomy statutes. For
example, scholars contend that Hardwick governs only
unmarried homosexuals, and that married homosexuals, like
their heterosexual counterparts, can exercise a right to
52. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
(1996); Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 134 (1987); Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and
Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699
(1998); Michael J. Kantoz, Comment, For Better or For Worse: A Critical Analysis of
Florida's Defense of Marriage AcL 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 439 (1998).
53. As discussed infra Part II, homosexual marriage is a state-based issue and,
therefore, is insulated from many of the problems that vitiate the federal claim.
54. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
55. See Kanotz, supra note 52, at 450-51.
56. The fundamental rights arm of equal protection was first asserted in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). The Court subjected
apportionment statutes to strict scrutiny because "any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Id. at 562.
57. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 52, at 153-72; Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination. 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 197, 221-34 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 WiS. L. REv. 187, 188-96 (1988).
712 [Vol. 50:693
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sodomy.58 If the proponents succeeded in limiting the holding of
Hardwick to unmarried homosexuals, they would establish an
explicit homosexual marriage right and an implicit federal right
to sodomy for homosexual married couples.
These homosexual rights claims, though potent, are
problematic. First, even legal scholars who are sympathetic to
homosexual rights have acknowledged the authority of the state
legislature to establish the legal provisions for marriage.60 In
light of this point, the possibilities of establishing a federal right
to either homosexual marriage or to wedded sodomy are dim.
Second, constitutional precedent undermines the claim that
Hardwick is limited to unmarried homosexuals. The Court
analogized the sexual choices of the unmarried and the married
under equal protection fourteen years prior to Hardwick6
therefore, it is unlikely that the Court would coherently allow
states to criminalize sodomy only for the unwedded homosexual
if it did not allow states to distinguish the sexual choices of the
unmarried and married heterosexual. As such, Hardwick
applies to both married and single homosexuals or to neither.
Until the Court rejects Hardwick, the marital status of
homosexual couples remains irrelevant.
Third, if the fundamental right to marriage is viewed as an
unspecified general right that all persons possess, including
homosexuals, then participants of any type of alternative
lifestyle could assert the same right.6 2 In other words, the
58. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great,
Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental
Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 921, 975 (1995) ("Likewise, states can criminalize
sodomy between unmarried homosexuals without implying that sodomy between
married homosexuals is so precluded.").
59. Not all homosexual proponents seek the right to marriage. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1488-95 (1993)
(explicating the rationales of homosexual proponents who argue against the
pursuit of a right to same-sex marriage).
60. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTruTIoNAL LAw 1432 (2d ed. 1988)
("Marriage, unlike other manifestations of intimate association, is a contract
controlled by the state-and like 'any other institution'-it is 'subject to the
control of the legislature."').
61. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (recognizing the right
of the married and unmarried to purchase contraceptives).
62. Justice Scalia adumbrated the outlines of this response in Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Polygamists, and those who have
a polygamous 'orientation,' have been 'singled out' by these [state] provisions [that
forever prohibit polygamy] for much more severe treatment than merely denial of
favored status . ... "). Justice Scalia noted that after Romer, an argument could be
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deconstruction of marriage abrogates any normative boundaries.
Homosexual advocates could steadfastly affirm that this right
should be unlimited, but the federal judiciary is unlikely to
jettison several federal precedents and laws in all fifty states by
allowing every conceivable type of marriage. Currently, states
do not recognize marriages involving bigamy, polygamy, incest,
and mental incapacitation, even if these are loving, voluntary
relationships. 4
And abrogation of traditional mores would still impose a moral
judgment, as every prescription or proscription of marriage
articulates a view of what ought to constitute this social
institution and, therefore, dictates a normative view of the good.
Thus, the jurists who opposed the right to homosexual marriage
in Baker v. Vermont mistakenly stated that this question was
entirely a legal issue rather than a moral." By rejecting a
homosexual's right to marry because the concept differs from
the popular definition of marriage the jurists imposed a
normative view of marriage that excludes homosexual couples.
Hardwick exacerbates this threat to homosexual marriage
because the Court asserted the right of citizens to ground laws,
including those forbidding homosexual sodomy, on morality.
made that states, which have constitutionally outlawed polygamy, must now
remove these provisions as unconstitutional. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Cf. id. (Scalla, J., dissenting) (citing the relevant constitutional precedents
and state constitutions that proscribe polygamy).
64. Cf Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (upholding a federal
statute proscribing bigamy); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn.
1961) (holding that a marriage between an uncle and his niece, which was valid in
Italy, the country where it was originally recognized, contravened the public policy
of Connecticut, thereby invalidating the marriage); Johnson v. E.W., 658 N.Y.S.2d
780, 781 (1997) (holding that guardians could seek to annul a marriage contract
entered into by incapacitated persons).
65. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) ('The issue before the
Court, moreover, does not turn on the religious or moral debate over intimate
same-sex relationships, but rather on the statutory and constitutional basis for the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the secular benefits and protections offered
married couples.").
66. Id. at 868 ("Although it is not necessarily the only possible definition, there
is no doubt that the plain and ordinary meaning of 'marriage' is the union of one
man and one woman as husband and wife.").
67. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right,
respondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and
that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale
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This creates a formidable task for homosexual advocates,
namely, vindicating their normative view of marriage at the
expense of the status quo.
Hardwick threatens conventional homosexual rights strategies
based upon equal protection claims-grounded on rational
review or strict scrutiny-as well as the more contemporary
same-sex marriage claim.
II. THE SUBORDINATION OF HOMOSEXUAL EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS
In light of the inadequacies of standard homosexual equal
protection claims, Part II examines two novel, but potent, equal
protection theories. Part II.A critiques Cass Sunstein's attempt
to isolate equal protection fundamental rights from due process
precedents. Part II.B analyzes Ronald Dworkin's theory of equal
respect.
A. Sunstein's Uncoupling of Equal Protection and Due Process
Before constitutional scholars can establish a homosexual
equal protection claim, they must offer either a theory of equal
protection that is immune to Hardwick or a foundational
argument for isolating equal protection claims from due process
precedents. Part I exposed several problematic attempts to
realize the former option; we now scrutinize an attempt at the
latter.
The importance of Hardwick for homosexual equal protection
rights cannot be understated. In several important homosexual
rights cases, federal jurists have subordinated a contested
homosexual equal protection claim to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hardwick.68 Jurists who support homosexual rights
to support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on notions of
morality ....
Id; see also id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("To hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast
aside millenla of moral teaching.").
68. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
If the Court [in Hardwick] was unwilling to object to state laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open... to
conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is
invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
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have acknowledged Hardwicks suasion.69  Therefore, to
vindicate a homosexual's equal protection claim, homosexual
rights proponents must isolate the claim from due process
precedents.
Cass Sunstein articulates the most compelling attempt to
isolate homosexual equal protection claims from due process
precedents. Sunstein, in an influential argument for
homosexual rights, 70 distinguishes the two claims by arguing
that the judiciary has interpreted the Due Process Clause, from
its inception, as the conservator of traditional practices against
novel departures brought by temporary majorities.71  Sunstein
notes that the Court illustrated the tradition-based character of
due process in Hardwick when it asserted that homosexual
sodomy could be specified as a fundamental due process right if
it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 2  Due process
jurisprudence looks backward rather than forward. 3
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, is progressive; it
self-consciously repudiates history and tradition as
constitutional principles. 4  Sunstein claims that the
"fundamental rights" branch of equal protection prohibits states
criminal.
Id.; see also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Te Supreme Court has ruled that homosexual activity
is not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process and that the
proper standard of review under the Fifth Amendment is rational basis review.").
69. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir.
1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("When conduct that plays a central role in
defining a group may be prohibited by the state, it cannot be asserted with any
legitimacy that the group is specially protected by the Constitution."), reh'g granted
en banc, 847 F.2d 1362, (9th Cir. 1988).
70. Several authors cite Sunstein's article to justify isolating equal protection
jurisprudence from due process. See Christensen, supra note 52, at 1705; Toni M.
Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 45 & n.3 (1996); Teresa
M. Bruce, Note, Neither Liberty Nor Justice: Anti-Gay Initiatives, Political
Participation, and the Rule of Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 431, 443 n.90
(1996).
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161,
1163 (1988) ("From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run
departures.").
72. Id. at 1161 (citing Hardwick).
73. See id. at 1163, 1174.
74. Id. at 1168 ("[Tihe Equal Protection Clause is a self-conscious repudiation
of history and tradition as defining constitutional principles.").
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from classifying citizens with regard to rights unprotected by the
Due Process Clause. Sunstein writes that the Court has barred
states from discriminating among classes with regard to the75 76
right to marry,75 to procreate, 7 and to use contraception,7 7 even
if the Due Process Clause does not explicitly guarantee these
rights.78  Thus, Sunstein concludes that Hardwick does not
invalidate equal protection claims designed to protect
homosexual interests. 9
But Sunstein's historical interpretation of both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clause is problematic. First, other
legal scholars, including many who are predisposed to granting
homosexuals rights, offer discrepant interpretations of
substantive due process. For example, some scholars suggest
that the Due Process Clause contains an aspirational dimension
that transcends tradition.80 Sunstein mitigates the cogency of
his argument by admitting that the history of due process is
ambiguous, and that tradition has not been the exclusive focus
of due process jurisprudence."
A second deficiency in Sunstein's account is that the rights he
cites as equal protection fundamental rights8 2 are, or would be,
considered due process rights. For example, the Court
characterized both the right to marry 3 and the right to use
contraception84 as fundamental due process rights before certain
classes mounted equal protection claims. Further, in Skinner v.
75. Id. at 1169 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
76. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
77. Id. (discussing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
78. Id. at 1168-69.
79. Id. at 1163.
80. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 10 (1984);
James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 57
(1995) (asserting that "between Palko and [Hardwick], the Court took a flight
from aspirational principles to historical practices" in determining what due
process requires); Richard B. Saphire, Originalism and the Importance of
Constitutional Aspirations, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 601 (1997).
81. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 1170-71.
82. Id. at 1169; see generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978)
(finding a right to marry); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972)
(establishing that married and unmarried couples have a right to obtain
contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (identifying marriage
and procreation as fundamental rights).
83. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (claiming that the rights "to
marry, [to] establish a home and [to] bring up children" are central to the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause).
84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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Oklahoma,5 (the case that Sunstein cites to support an equal
protection right to procreate), the Court acknowledged, but did
not find it necessary to consider, the due process character of
the underlying claim. Subsequently, the Court recognized the
due process right to procreate. Thus, Sunstein's historical
account of equal protection fundamental rights, which is crucial
to his discussion, is problematic because the rights that he uses
as examples were, in fact, previously recognized as due process
fundamental rights. Moreover, contrary to Sunstein's proposal
in the case of homosexual rights, those rights he identifies as
fundamental were not rejected under due process before being
upheld under equal protection. Therefore, Sunstein cannot
analogize a homosexual fundamental equal protection claim to
those claims relating to birth control, marriage, or procreation.
A third deficiency in Sunstein's theory is that he fails to
formulate criteria that would distinguish among substantive
equal protection claims.88 If the Equal Protection Clause is
progressive rather than tradition-based, then Sunstein must
offer a non-tradition-bound method to distinguish those acts
that merit equal protection deference. His failure to provide
such a method diminishes the coherence of his argument.
Finally, Sunstein's theory is subverted by the Court's tethering
of due process and equal protection in Boiling v. Sharpe,9 which
introduced the equal protection aspect of the Due Process
Clause.90 In Bolling, the Court struck down the District of
85. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
86. Id. at 538.
It is argued that due process is lacking because, under this Act, unlike
the Act upheld in Buck v. Bell, the defendant is given no opportunity to
be heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable potential parent
of socially undesirable offspring .... We pass [this] point[] without
intimating an opinion on [it] ....
Id. (footnote & citations omitted). The Court acknowledged, however, that inflicting
castration would forever deprive the individual of "a basic liberty." Id. at 541.
87. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
88. Even Supreme Court Justices have noted the difficulty in identifying
fundamental equal protection rights. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I must reiterate that I know of nothing which
entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities, characterize them as
'fundamental,' and give them added protection under an unusually stringent equal
protection test.").
89. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
90. Id. at 500
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Columbia's school segregation policy.9 ' In that case, the Court
could not employ the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee because it applies only to the states; instead, the
majority employed the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process, which does govern the District of Columbia. The
Court justified this substitution because these two amendments
have a similar character. Sunstein neglects this important
precedent in his attempt to distance equal protection from due
process; thus, his theory is undermined by his narrow
interpretation of equal protection. The history of constitutional
jurisprudence belies Sunstein's attempt to untether equal
protection from due process.
This critique of Sunstein's theory is instructive for those who
endeavor to establish state-based homosexual equal protection
claims. Two jurists, who disputed the rationale of the majority
in the Baker v. Vermont decision, appealed to federal equal
protection jurisprudence to ground same-sex rights9  The
majority, by contrast, relied solely on the terms in the Vermont
Constitution.94 The latter approach is more tenable in light of
the symbiotic relationship that persists between federal equal
protection and due process jurisprudence-and especially given
the precedent of Hardwick. State jurists who are amenable to
homosexual rights must avoid implicating the federal Equal
Protection Clause; instead, they must appeal to some other
source to support those rights.
B. Equal Protection and Equal Respect
Another novel strategy to establish homosexual equal
protection rights theorizes that the Equal Protection Clause
constitutionally mandates states to treat all citizens with equal
91. Id.
92. Id. 498-99
93. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 892 (Vt. 1999) (Dooley, J.,
concurring) ("Because of the historical similarity, I find it useful to look to Oregon
case law, and the United States Supreme Court decisions upon which it relies, in
considering whether lesbians and gay men are a suspect classification under
Article 7."); id. at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that Vermont's common-benefits jurisprudence is coextensive with equal
protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. Id. at 870 ("lit is important to emphasize at the outset that it is the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution we are construing, rather
than its counterpart, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.").
20011 719
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:693
respect.9 5 This influential concept of equality has been advanced
by some of the most prominent political and legal scholars of the
last three decades, including Ronald Dworkin,9 6  Charles
Larmore, 7 and John Ely.9 8  This section scrutinizes Ronald
Dworkin's writings because he has articulated the most
developed constitutional argument for equal respect and has
applied it to homosexual rights.
Dworkin focuses his attention on equality because he denies
the existence of a general right to liberty that might justify
specific rights.99 Dworkin theorizes that the Equal Protection
Clause bestows a right to treatment as an equal, which is not
the right to equal distribution of a burden or benefit, but the
right to be treated with the same respect as anyone else' 00 The
95. See Thompson v. Mazo, 421 F.2d 1156, 1160 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see
also Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1011 (1984) ("At the most general level,
the equal protection clause is associated with a requirement that, in making
governmental decisions, the decisionmaker respect equally all persons in the
jurisdiction."); Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love,
Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1042 (1989) ("[Olne can
reasonably argue that the equal protection clause embodies the notion of equality
as a right whose meaning ought to be discerned within a context of compassion, or
respect.") (footnote omitted); Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation
as Equal Protection, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1211, 1221 (1985).
Dean Ely's suggestion that governments must accord equal respect to
all citizens provides a basic insight into the meaning of equal
protection. Further analysis of the concept of equal respect, however,
suggests that it is inconsistent with the pluralist model. The equal
respect requirement challenges all governmental decisionmakers to
provide some principled justification for choosing to benefit a successful
pluralist coalition rather than some other possible majority, even if the
burdened groups do not include victims of historical discrimination.
Harper & Lupu, supra, at 1221; Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer
v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453, 454 (1997);
Justice West, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1876, 1893 (1999) ("The core purpose of law, or of the rule of law, is not contract,
but rather, the protection of rights, the most important of which is the individual's
right to equal respect, and accordingly, equal protection under the law.").
96. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1978) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, RGHTS].
97. CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATrERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 67 (1987) ("A
commitment to treating others with equal respect forms the ultimate reason why
in the face of disagreement we should keep the conversation going . .
98. ELY, supra note 47, at 14-21, 82-87, 135-79.
99. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 266-67.
100. Id. at 272-73. Dworkln reiterates his theory in Freedom's Law when he
posits that the "defining aim of democracy is that collective decisions be made by
political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices treat all
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gravamen of Dworkin's argument is that the equal respect
encompassed by the Equal Protection Clause proscribes laws
that impose a view of the good on citizens, and thereby
undermines their self-respect. 1'
Integral to self-respect is individual freedom or autonomy that
the government can respect only by adopting a morally-neutral
stance on an individual's choices.'0 2 Hence, the state denies
homosexuals equal concern and respect when it constrains their
sexual liberty because the majority finds it distasteful or
disapproves of homosexual culture.'0 3  For Dworkin, only the
harm principle can constrain autonomy without violating equal
respect and the constitutional right to equal protection.
0 4
But Dworkin's theory of equal respect does not relevantly differ
from the Court's recent interpretation of due process. Like
Dworkin's theory, the Due Process Clause guarantees those
liberties that are fundamental,'05 among which includes those
members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect."
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 17 (1995) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW].
101. RONALD DwORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
PRINCIPLE] ("[Eiquality supposes that political decisions must be, so far as possible,
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to
life .... [The government does not treat [citizens] as equals if it prefers one
conception to another ... ").
102. Id. at 239, 205-06 (elevating self-respect to the summum bonum, and
integral to self-respect is self-determination or autonomy).
In this essay I shall set out what I believe are the main principles of
liberalism based on equality. This form of liberalism insists that
government must treat people as equals in the following sense. It must
impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an
argument that the citizen could not accept without abandoning his
sense of his equal worth . . . no self-respecting person who believes that
a particular way to live is most valuable for him can accept that this
way of life is base or degrading.
Id. (footnote ommitted).
103. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 101, at 68.
104. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 271-72. Dworkin entertains two other
types of arguments, idealistic and utilitarian, that could theoretically limit liberty
in the liberal conception of equality. However, he ultimately dismisses both of
these alternatives. Id. at 272-78.
105. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that there is a
right to personal privacy, in which fundamental rights are included); see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (establishing the right to use
contraception as fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
(rejecting a state statute requiring sterilization of habitual criminals because it
interfered with the fundamental right to procreate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (listing those liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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integral to autonomy. °6 Due process and Dworkin's theory of
equal respect safeguard autonomy by mandating state neutrality
toward views of what is acceptable or good. 10 7  The Court
described due process autonomy in terms that resemble equal
respect.'0 8 Other constitutional scholars advanced variations of
Dworkin's equal respect theory, cast in terms of equal
citizenship'0 9 or anti-caste imperatives 11o to justify homosexual
rights, but these are also reducible to due process fundamental
rights.
If Dworkin's concept of equal respect as autonomy is
indistinguishable from due process autonomy, then any
homosexual right grounded on this principle is vulnerable to the
due process precedents. Because the Court has employed
privacy and autonomy synonymously"', equal protection for
homosexual autonomy is subverted by the Court's due process
rejection of the privacy right to sodomy. Thus, the foundational
theory of equal respect, like other homosexual equal protection
106. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ('These
matters [marriage, procreation, and family relationships], involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pr6tected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) ("Few decisions are more personal and
intimate, more properly private, or more basic to Individual dignity and autonomy,
than a woman's decision ... whether to end her pregnancy.").
107. Justice Stevens' opinion in Casey, predicated on the Due Process Clause,
illustrates the neutrality requirement of due process. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject into a woman's
most personal deliberations its own views of what is best.").
108. Id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Part of the
constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is
entitled.").
109. Kenneth L. Karst, Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 58 (1977) ('The focus of equal citizenship here
is ... a right to take responsibility for choosing one's own future. Louis Henkin's
use of the word 'autonomy' to describe the right in question is apt....") (footnote
omitted): see also KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESsION: VISIONS OF
POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 182 (1993).
110. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As
a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1299 (1985) ('Tbis alternative
vision [of suspectness] defines suspect classifications as those based on
characteristics that are essential elements of personhood and yet focal points of
discrimination.") (footnote omitted).
I 11. See John Safranek & Stephen Safranek, Licensing Liberty: The Self-




claims based on rational review, suspectness, or the right to
marry, founders on the shoals of Hardwick.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALOGOUS REASONING
A basic tenet of justice -treating like cases alike-animates
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 1 2  In
recognizing equal protection rights, the Court asserts that the
state is treating two classes of similarly situated citizens
differently. Conversely, the Court recognizes a new due process
right when the claim resembles a redundant similar class of
acts. 1 3  Part III.A applies this distinction relevantly between
classes of citizens and similar acts to homosexual equal
protection claims, and Part III.B analogizes the legal position of
homosexual rights proponents to those of assisted suicide.
A. Equal Protection Homosexual Rights
This section touches on the emotive character of homosexual
relationships to underscore the burden that Hardwick places on
substantial homosexual rights claims. Homosexual proponents
often dismiss the equal protection import of Hardwick because
they obscure the character of homosexual desiderata: what
distinguishes homosexuals from heterosexuals is the eros for a
person of the same sex. 1 14  Therefore, homosexuals are not
content to settle for rights that they already retain and that
inhere in platonic relationships such as the freedom to live
together, to share intimate thoughts, or to otherwise live as
friends. The partners of nearly any male or female relationship
already retain these rights.
To the contrary, the constitutional debate over homosexual
rights primarily concerns sexual acts. This is the telos of
homosexual eros. It is this relational dynamic of homosexual
erotic love that serves as the matrix for homosexual equal
protection claims both within and outside of marriage.
Homosexual relationships, like heterosexual relationships, are
112. See Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1313, 1317-18 (1996) (detailing
examples of the emotive unrest when the justice system fails to treat like cases
alike).
113. See Hunter, supranote 9, at 531-32.
114. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the term
"homosexual"). The homosexual relationships at the heart of constitutional
scrutiny are not platonic; to think otherwise is, at the very least, misguided.
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not wholly sexual, but encompass a vast array of interpersonal
facets. Homosexual erotic love and its institutionalization in
marriage, like its heterosexual analogue, aim at sexual union
with another.
Some homosexual advocates obfuscate this relational dynamic
when disputing anti-homosexual laws that exclude on the basis
of homosexual orientation. For example, when contesting
exclusionary military statutes, homosexual advocates attempt to
isolate the orientation from the tendencies that emanate from
it."15  Although pragmatic in the short-run, this approach
heralds a retreat to the closet by timidly concealing the essence
of homosexual love.
The reductivism of equal protection sexual autonomy claims to
due process discussed in Part II adumbrates the problematic
character of nearly any substantial homosexual equal protection
right. The tenet underlying the Equal Protection Clause-to
treat like persons alike-does not specify the criteria that
distinguish similar or different classes of persons. '  However,
the history of equal protection jurisprudence instructs that the
classifications that courts have historically granted strict
scrutiny cannot be reduced to the acts in dispute. For example,
racial minorities, who constitute the paradigmatic class for equal
protection jurisprudence, were not classified by the practices for
which they sought constitutional protection, such as voting
rights,"' desegregated educational facilities," 8 or equitable
judicial processes." 9 Rather, racial minorities were classified by
115. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1997) ("rhis court further observed that any attempted
identification of homosexuals by non-behavioral attributes could have no meaning,
because the law could not successfully categorize persons 'by subjective and
unapparent characteristics such as innate desires, drives, and thoughts."')
(citation omitted); .High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic: it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits
such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-
suspect classes. The behavior or conduct of such already recognized classes is
irrelevant to their identification.") (citations omitted).
116. TRIBE, supra note 60, at 1514 ('The words of the equal protection clause do
not, by themselves, tell us as much as we might wish. The central concept of the
clause, equality, requires the specification of substantive values before it has full
meaning."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
117. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
118. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. Seegenerally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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their race and denied rights to these constitutional practices,
which other races already enjoyed. 120 When African-Americans
were constrained from performing the same acts as whites, they
were legally distinguished not by the acts they sought to perform
but by the color of their skin.
12 1
In contradistinction, homosexuals are classified by their eros,
which seeks fulfillment with members of the same gender. The
Hardwick Court refused to invalidate state laws that
criminalized the act central to this classification. 122 Therefore, if
homosexuals are classified by an act that the Court allows the
state to criminalize, they cannot claim that they are aggrieved
because they do not retain an equal protection right to this
criminal act.123 It is Hardwick, root and branch, which must be
rejected before the Equal Protection Clause can be invoked. 124 If
the Court declines to recognize a right to homosexual sex by
repudiating this due process precedent and continues to allow
states to proscribe homosexual sodomy under due process, then
it cannot coherently claim that states deny equal protection to
homosexuals who desire to engage in this practice within or
outside the confines of marriage.
B. The Analogy Between Assisted-Suicide and Homosexual
Rights
The peril posed by Hardwick for any substantive equal
protection homosexual right is illuminated by the analogous
jurisprudence of assisted suicide. Assisted suicide resembles
homosexual rights in several respects. First, assisted suicide
plaintiffs are classified by a particular act, namely, obtaining
help to end their lives. Like homosexuals, they may share many
characteristics, such as being terminally ill, attending the same
120. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ('The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.").
121. See Plckhardt, supra note 8, at 957 ("[All of the Court's privacy cases, as
opposed to its equality cases, have concerned rights of 'doing' as opposed to rights
of 'being."').
122. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
123. See DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 248-55 (discussing the role of
morality in criminalizing homosexuality); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 136-37 (1981) (comparing state classifications of homosexuals
and burglars).
124. Of course, once due process is transformed, then appeals to equal
protection would be unnecessary.
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support groups, sharing intimate thoughts, or living in a
hospice; however, what ultimately classifies them is the act they
seek to practice.
Second, the equal protection jurisprudence of assisted suicide
resembles that of homosexual rights claims because both
recapitulate respective rationales that were rejected when
asserted under the auspice of due process. A due process right
to assisted suicide was initially recognized by the Ninth Circuit
and predicated on the precedents of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey125 and Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.126 From
Casey, the court extracted a right to autonomy, 21 which it
claimed encompasses "the right to die."128 Cruzan protects the
individual's due process right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, including life-sustaining measures. 29  The Ninth
Circuit Court denied any relevant distinctions between
withdrawing life-sustaining therapy and administering lethal
medicine, 130 allowing the due process "right to die" from Casey to
govern this putatively similar case.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently overturned
the Ninth Circuit's opinion by denying a due process right to
assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg.'3' This unanimous
decision was released simultaneously with the Court's rejection
of the Second Circuit's recognition of an equal protection right to
assisted suicide in Vacco v. Quill.132  Glucksberg amplifies the
challenge that Hardwick presents.
The claim for the right to assisted suicide in Glucksberg rested
on the due process rights to autonomy and to refuse life-
sustaining therapy. 133 In Vacco, the claim to assisted suicide
125. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
126. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
127. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
128. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir.
1996) ("Casey and Cruzan provide persuasive evidence that the Constitution
encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of
one's death-that there is, in short, a constitutionally recognized 'right to die."'),
rev'd sub nom, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
129. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
130. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822 ('The distinctions [between acts of
omission and commission] suggested by the state do not individually or collectively
serve to distinguish the medical practices society currently accepts.").
131. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
132. 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (denying an equal protection right to assisted suicide).
133. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703.
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was premised on the equal protection right to be treated
similarly to those seeking to forego life-sustaining therapy.
13 4
The class of persons implicated in the equal protection claim-
those seeking to forego therapy-is specified by the same act
cited in the due process claim, the act of foregoing therapy.
Therefore, once the Court rejected the due process claim,
pursuing an equal protection claim became futile because it
merely reformulated the due process claim in terms of the
agents rather than the act in question. To wit, one can
analogize assisted suicide to the refusal of treatment either in
terms of the act, or in terms of the agents: the act of assisted
suicide is analogous to the constitutionally recognized act of
refusing treatment, or the right of those seeking assisted suicide
is analogous to individuals who retain the right to refuse
treatment.
In each case, citizens seek the same right to the identical act,
only under different auspices. With regard to due process, the
plaintiffs claim that their act is similar to the act of foregoing
medical therapy. With respect to equal protection, the plaintiffs
claim that they are situated similarly to those who seek to forego
medical therapy. However, the claims are indistinguishable in
all relevant respects; they differ only insofar as one is articulated
in terms of the act, the other by the agents.
Therefore, once the Court circumscribed the Cruzan autonomy
holding in Glucksberg, and dismissed the due process analogy
between assisted suicide and letting-die, it undermined the
equal protection claim by denying the analogous character of the
respective agents' positions. If, for the purposes of
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts are not analogous, then
neither are the agents who participate in these acts. Once the
Court denied a due process right to assisted suicide, it logically
had to reject an equal protection claim predicated on the
putatively analogous positions of the agents performing the acts.
Homosexual equal protection claims are similarly threatened
by due process precedents. Homosexual proponents have
resorted to two types of equal protection claims because the
Court denied a due process right to homosexual sodomy. The
first claim asserts the same sexual autonomy right that
134. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
(holding no valid Equal Protection difference between the so-called passive
assistance and active assistance).
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heterosexuals can exercise. The shortcoming of this claim is
that the Court has used privacy synonymously with autonomy.
Therefore, if due process autonomy does not encompass
homosexual sodomy, then neither does equal protection
autonomy. Recapitulating this claim in terms of agents rather
than acts does not change its merits. Hardwick denied
homosexuals the due process privacy right to sexual autonomy
that heterosexuals enjoy; therefore, the agents of these
respective acts are not similarly situated for constitutional
purposes.
Similarly, the second type of equal protection claim, seeking
the right to homosexual marriage, is also influenced by
Hardwick. If the act of homosexual sodomy is so dissimilar to
marriage and intimate heterosexual choices, and can be
proscribed by the moral dictate of the state, as the Court claims,
then the assertion of the suspect or semi-suspect status for the
class defined by this act is untenable when the institution of
homosexual marriage would automatically include homosexual
eros and sodomy. If intimate homosexual choices are so
dissimilar from those of heterosexuals under due process, and
can be proscribed because of the dissimilarity, then the analogy
of homosexual to heterosexual marriage is most tenuous.
The endeavor to recast homosexual rights claims in equal
protection terms is nearly futile since the Court has denied the
due process analogy between the act that classifies homosexuals
and other constitutional intimate acts. Attempts to reformulate
homosexual rights in terms of agents rather than acts cannot
emancipate homosexual rights claims from the yoke of
Hardwick.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reluctance of Vermont jurists in Baker v. Vermont to
recognize a same-sex right to marry may spur scholars to appeal
to the United States Constitution as a guarantor of substantial
homosexual rights. Given the due process precedent of
Hardwick, scholars will undoubtedly seek refuge in other parts
of the Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause.
35
135. See Bruce, supra note 70, at 442 ("Hardwick forecloses the application of
strict scrutiny in the substantive due process area, forcing pro-gay litigators to




Neither conventional nor novel homosexual equal protection
arguments can ground a federal constitutional right to
homosexual sex or marriage in light of Hardwick. Few scholars
have attempted and none have succeeded in uncoupling equal
protection and due process jurisprudence. It is unlikely that
scholars will ever coherently isolate Hardwick because
homosexual equality claims seem inherently reductive to due
process.
Therefore, constitutional scholars supportive of homosexual
rights should examine the implications of Hardwick before
impetuously embracing a federal equal protection strategy to
achieve meaningful homosexual rights. The disappointments in
Hawaii, 36 Alaska,13 and Vermont138  should not induce
homosexual rights proponents to seek refuge in the federal
Equal Protection Clause as long as Hardwick remains good
precedent. Only by subverting the rationale of Hardwick, or
grounding the homosexual rights claim entirely on state
constitutions, can proponents succeed in attaining legal
recognition for substantive homosexual interests.
136. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (denying state sanctioned
marriage to same-sex couples).
137. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska, Feb. 27, 1998) (upholding denial of a marriage license to same-sex
couples).
138. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (denying injunctive relief to
same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses).
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